Hou (2014), "The Abusive Nature of Price Squeeze in the EU", IIC- International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 45(1), 43-74

[Abstract] This article explores the abusive nature of price squeeze through investigating why a dominant undertaking subject to a price squeeze liability cannot be allowed to benefit from its competition advantages over vertical integration. As a result, a price squeeze liability seems to oblige a dominant undertaking to subsidize non-vertically integrated competitors. This goes against the general proposition that competition law protects only competition rather than (inefficient) competitors. The examination of the six price-squeeze cases within the context of EU competition law reveals that price squeeze cannot be fully explained by other closely related concepts, such as excessive pricing, predatory pricing and refusal to deal. Accordingly, this article develops a new theory for the abusive nature of price squeeze. Price squeeze, as this theory tries to establish, aims to maintain competition on a regulated market where a sector-specific regulator imposes both a duty to deal and a price regulation upon the dominant undertaking concerned.

[Keywords] Price Squeeze, Abuse of Dominant Position, Sector-Specific Regulation, EU Law